Environment Politics

Georgia’s Vogtle Venture

The newest nuclear energy, its cost, and the related backlash

Clean energy is a major focus within the United States. According to the Energy Information Administration, Georgia’s energy profile is about 40% clean — meaning carbon-free — in 2024, and according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, nuclear power accounts for 77.4% of this energy. As corporations work toward their own sustainability goals, areas with clean energy are attractive for many sectors. For example, Hyundai selected Georgia for its $5.5 billion electric vehicle and battery plant in 2022 “because of its [Georgia’s] commitment to a clean energy future.” Additionally, Georgia has the 11th most data centers of any state, with Microsoft recently announcing a $1.8 billion data center that will more than double the capacity of data centers around Atlanta.

About one-third of all electricity generated in Georgia is nuclear energy sourced from either the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant or Plant Vogtle, compared to the approximately 10% of energy that comes from solar and wind renewables. This is due, in part, to the new Vogtle Units 3 and 4. This nuclear energy is reliable, with nuclear plants supplying energy independently of external influences (such as weather and time of day). Large manufacturing and technology plants require energy at all times, so a dependency on weather or time of year is not an option.

Nuclear energy is reliable, with nuclear plants supplying energy independently of external influences like time of day and weather.

Vogtle has been active since 1987 when the first reactor, Unit 1, came online. Unit 2, an identical pressurized water reactor (PWR), shortly followed in 1989. Vogtle Units 3 and 4 — Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) reactors — are different models of PWRs. They are newly operational, with Unit 3 joining the grid in 2023 and Unit 4 in 2024. The new units double the capacity of Plant Vogtle. In the first three months of all four Vogtle units operating, the average energy generation per month for Plant Vogtle was 3.15 million MWhs. This is twice the average production of 1.58 million MWhs per month from Units 1 and 2 between 2001 and 2022.

This is predictably twice the average production of 1.58 million MWhs per month from Units 1 and 2 between 2001 and 2022.

The vast majority of active nuclear reactors in the United States today are Gen II, whereas the Vogtle AP1000 reactors are Gen III+ reactors. Multiple AP1000s in China, which came online in 2018, show global movement toward Gen III+ reactors. A Gen III+ reactor’s lifetime before major maintenance is necessary is 60 years, a 50% increase from older Gen II reactors’ 40 years. Clearly the new units are contributing to reliable energy for Georgia, so why the backlash? 

Vogtle’s expansion was notably surrounded by controversy regarding its $35 billion cost and 15-year construction period, greatly exceeding the initial estimate of $14 billion with an 8-year timeframe. In building the first U.S. reactor from scratch in 30 years, it’s understandable that Georgia Power, the company driving the plant’s expansion, faced many issues, but what could have led to such drastic underestimations in timeframe and price?

In March of 2023, the Department of Energy (DOE) began publishing several “Liftoff Reports” that provided an informative basis for implementing new clean energy, like nuclear, in the private sector. The reports heavily cited the Vogtle units due to their role as the first new reactors in the US. Per the Liftoff Reports, the cost of building reactors decreases as “Nth-of-a-kind” status is achieved. Nth-of-a-kind reactors are reactors built once a supply chain is already in place, so as the “N” number of reactors increases, building costs reduce and efficiency increases until the supply chain is complete. First-of-a-kind reactors, such as Vogtle, cost about twice as much as Nth-of-a-kind reactors. This is because new models require up-to-date, specialized construction equipment.

Anna Schafer, a Georgia Tech student with internship experience at Plant Vogtle, said, “In the nuclear world, it’s all about First-of-a-kind to Nth-of-a-kind… The supply chain and the workforce will develop with more orders.” As the first in 30 years, the Vogtle Unit 3 didn’t have the benefits of an Nth-of-a-kind reactor and thus faced a number of supply chain issues. Further supporting this claim, according to the DOE, “Unit 4 is estimated to have been roughly 30% more efficient and 20% cheaper to build than Unit 3,” showing an immediate decrease in cost.

“Unit 4 is estimated to have been roughly 30% more efficient and 20% cheaper to build than unit 3,” showing an immediate decrease in cost.

As publicized by Georgia Power, the new reactors are on the cutting edge of nuclear technology but are still related to previous reactors. The AP1000 is based on similar PWR technology present in 63 other active reactors in the U.S. Additionally, the AP1000 has automated safety precautions, meaning all safety measures kick in automatically and without requiring electricity. It’s also more efficient than other reactors in terms of material usage. It produces more electric power while using less raw materials like concrete and steel in construction. Lastly, it has a much lower “core damage frequency” (CDF) than other reactors. CDF is the probability of a serious accident damaging the reactor core. The CDF of an AP1000 is 5.1 x 10-7, meaning one such accident is estimated to happen in about two million years of reactor operation.

Regardless of these technical advancements, the new Vogtle units ended up costing more than twice their initial estimate. Three primary issues increased the cost of the plant (see chart below).

Three primary issues that increased the cost of the plant // Words by RJ Hunnewell, graphic by Elizabeth Adams

Alongside the expansion of Vogtle came an attempt at expanding the V.C. Summer nuclear project in South Carolina from one to three reactors. SCANA, the South Carolina-based energy company that drove the attempted expansion of the V.C. Summer plant initially invested $9 billion into two new AP1000 units in 2008. Westinghouse’s bankruptcy led to the cancellation of Units 2 and 3 in 2017. Two SCANA executives were charged with fraud in the aftermath of this cancellation for covering up struggles in the construction of the plant and the financial issues SCANA faced because of these struggles.

The bankruptcy of Westinghouse led to a close inspection of where the new Vogtle units stood in construction, and a new timeframe and cost assessment were necessary before the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) could rule on whether the project would continue.

Vogtle is a massive investment for the future, which will pay itself off in time, but in the meantime, ratepayers are shouldering much of the costs.

The PSC ruled that the continuation of the project was justified as long as Georgia Power bore a portion of the cost. Overall, Georgia Power took on approximately $3 billion of debt. Despite this additional contribution from Georgia Power, the monthly bills of Georgia Power ratepayers increased by 6%, or an average of $8.95 a month for the company to fund the $7.6 billion deficit resulting largely from the extended timeline.

However, according to Lizzy Yates, the director of external affairs and communications at Southern Nuclear, ratepayer costs only increased by 10% as a result of the plant — the same increase that Georgia Power initially stated at the beginning of the project. For Georgia  Power’s 2.4 million customers, however, a 10% increase in rates can be difficult to stomach. Given the rising cost of living, a growing utility bill is something many households object to. Vogtle is a massive investment for the future that will pay itself off in time, but in the meantime, some ratepayers feel they shoulder an unfair share of the costs.

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